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Our Study Mission focused on the potential for instability 
and hence military or other confrontations between North and 
South Korea that emanate from conditions within North Korea. It 
is of course possible that similar problems might emanate from 
South Korea. However, most of the focus of this discussion is on 
the North Korean economy, with some comparison to that to South 
Korea. 
We identified three major potential causes of instability. 
One is the potential threat of North Korea producing and hence 
possessing nuclear weapons. I, like others, consider this a 
highly destabilizing factor; it is discussed elsewhere in the 
This report is a result of participating in the Asia 
Society Study Mission on Peace and Security in the Korean 
Peninsula, which had briefings in the United States in April and 
met with senior officials and specialists in the capitals of The 
People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Japan, and the 
Soviet Union between May 8-29, 1991. This paper is 
impressionistic rather than scholarly, based on a partial reading 
of materials available in English and meetings, conversations, 
and observations during our trip. The study mission focused 
mainly on political and security issues, with considerably less 
discussion of economic or economic policy issues; nonetheless 
they figured significantly in our considerations. Most of this 
paper focuses on North Korea, since much less is known about it. 
In North Korea, in addition to our meetings with the First Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and senior members of the Institute 
of Disarmament and Peace, we met with the Vice President of the 
Agricultural College in Wonson, the President and Senior Faculty 
of Kim Il Sung University, and the Vice Minister of External 
Economic Affairs. I have benefitted from comments and 
corrections of factual errors by Professor Pong S.—Lee, 
Department of Economics, State University of New York at Albany, 
and Professor Robert Scalapino, leader of the Study Mission. 
What follows reflects my subjective judgments and evaluation, for 
which no one else can be blamed. 
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Study Mission report. A second factor is the transition of 
political leadership following the death of President Kim II 
Sung. While his son, Kim Jung II, apparently is his designated 
successor, there is some uncertainty as to the nature of the 
transition process. Typically in Communist nations the 
legitimacy of leadership change has been open to question and 
tension and conflicts in the transition period have been the 
norm. This second issue is also dealt with elsewhere in the 
Study Mission report. The third potential cause of instability 
lies in the possibility of economic decline, even collapse, of 
the North Korean economy sufficient to engender chaos which would 
have severe political and security repercussions. 
Discussions of peace and stability of the Korean peninsula 
tend to move very quickly to the issue of the reunification of 
the two parts of the Korean peninsula, which is after all 
populated by one people sharing a common language and long 
cultural heritage, into a single nation-state. Both North Korea 
and South Korea advocate this as the ultimate policy objective. 
Both assert that full reunification will take a long time to 
achieve, and indeed may be left to a future generation. 
Nonetheless, the reunification issue figures importantly in any 
discussion of economic conditions in North Korea and in South 
Korea, and in their economic relationship. 
THREE BASIC POINTS 
Any evaluation of the economies of the Korean peninsula must 
start with three fundamental facts: the two economies have very 
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different economic systems; the relative economic performance 
over time of the two economies has been very different, which has 
profound implications; and the differences in amount and 
availability of economic and other basic data are staggering. A 
great deal is known about the South Korean economy and its 
performance ; and very little accurate information is available 
about the North Korean economy and its performance. 
Two Very Different Economic Systems 
An obvious fact, which nonetheless needs always to be 
remembered and stressed, is that these two economies embody two 
very different economic and political systems that are in 
fundamental contradiction. 
South Korea has essentially a private enterprise, market 
economy, with private ownership of the means of production and 
great reliance on the price mechanism for the allocation of 
resources and the determination of what gets produced and sold. 
Importantly, it has pursued an export-oriented development 
strategy which has offset import-substituting industrial and 
agricultural policy biases, and has resulted in a deep 
integration of South Korea into the world economy. At the same 
The South Korean government publishes copious amounts of 
standard economic data and there are a number of studies of South 
Korea's economic success as a newly industrialized economy (NIE). 
For a recent overview, see Byung-Nak Song, The Rise of the Korean 
—Economy (Oxford University Proaaf 1QQ0) . Contemporary data and— 
materials are available through the Korea Economic Institute of 
America; see, for example, its Korea's Economy 1991f Vol. 7, #1 
(Spring 1991). 
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time, the economy has been subject to strong government policy 
leadership, interventionist in nature. The central government 
has played a major role in targeting priority industries by 
pursuing an active industrial policy, particularly in heavy and 
chemical industries, and has utilized the captive financial 
system to achieve its objectives. Rapid economic development 
since the mid-1960s took place under an authoritarian regime 
until 1987, when the polity moved to a democratic system of party 
politics and free elections. The assertive leadership and heavy 
hand of the government has been greater in the South Korean 
economy than in any other successful newly industrialized 
economy, or in Japan. 
In contrast, North Korea has a centrally planned, command 
economy in which resources are allocated by bureaucratic decision 
based on annual and seven-year plans. The basic model of central 
planning is that of the Soviet economy of the 1950s. So too is 
the development strategy. North Korea has adopted essentially a 
Stalinist model of economic development: first priority to heavy 
industry (steel, machinery, transport, equipment, and especially 
military hardware), then on consumer goods industries, and 
virtually no reliance on exports except to the extent they are 
required to pay for essential imports. Prices and markets have 
played virtually no role in this system. Trade, based on barter 
and currency-clearing type arrangements where possible, has been 
directed toward the friendly socialist nations, predominantly the 
Soviet Union, which historically supplied 50-60% of North Korean 
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imports and bought a comparable share of its exports. 
Onto this strategy has been grafted the Kim II Sung ideology 
of chuch'e (self-reliance) socialism, which in its economic 
dimension places an even greater emphasis on the domestic 
economy. As a self-reliant economy, the strategy has been to 
develop a diversified industrial structure in order to produce 
virtually all manufactured goods as well as foodstuffs and to 
minimize the role of trade. The concepts of economic 
specialization based on comparative advantage and interdependence 
with the world economy are far removed from chuch'e philosophy as 
it has been espoused to date. 
These profound differences in the respective economic 
systems have important implications. 
First, it is impossible to have full, complete economic 
integration, as we think normally occurs within the boundaries of 
a single nation, when two economic systems are so different: 
central planning versus market economy. Thus, the eventual 
complete reunification into one nation, the stated long-term 
goal, implies that there will have to be in principle only one 
economic system — either planning or market — as its core 
feature, though in practice some degree of mixed economy is 
possible and indeed likely. 
Nonetheless, it is quite possible for the North and South to 
engage in considerable economic interaction without full economic 
integration. The current situation of China and Taiwan suggests 
the possibilities of economic interaction between two systems. 
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In practice there has been virtually no trade between North and 
South Korea, essentially a decision made by the North Korean 
government. Thus far, the trade that has taken place has been 
done indirectly through Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore, 
notationally at least. South Korea released data on July 15, 
1991 that South Korea's indirect imports from North Korea jumped 
tenfold in the first six months of 1991 to $73.6 million, mainly 
zinc, steel, and fishery products; while North Korea imported 
$12.5 million indirectly from South Korea, mainly petrochemicals, 
textiles, and consumer products (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
July 25, 1991, p. 63) More important symbolically, a direct 
trade barter deal — 5,000 tons of South Korean rice for North 
Korean cement and coal — was negotiated in early 1991 and, 
following some hitches on both sides, as of summer 1991 evidently 
will be carried out. Thus, it is quite possible that trade could 
be substantially developed and expanded in due course, not only 
through indirect channels but directly. Similarly, while there 
are no joint ventures or joint cooperation projects at present, 
these are future possibilities. 
The relative importance of economic policy and security 
policy affects the respective approaches to economic relations 
between North and South. The North Korean government holds to 
For an interesting discussion of a step-by-step process 
of increasing economic integration, see Ha-Cheong Yeon, "Bridging 
the Chasm: Cooperative Economic Relation Between South and North 
Korea", Korea Development Institute Working Paper Number 9012, 
August 1990. 
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the position that politics dominates economics, and that there 
should be a resolution of political and security issues in some 
grand design, at least in preliminary form (such as 
confederation), prior to the development of economic 
relationships. Policy makers in South Korea take the position 
that economic and cultural and personal exchange relationships 
should develop prior to any grand political solution, on a step-
by-step approach, both on their own merits and as confidence-
building measures leading to more comprehensive political 
solutions. 
There has been a debate under way in North Korea for several 
years about some alterations in its development strategy. The 
third Seven Year Plan, begun in 1987, places a greater emphasis 
on the production of consumption goods relative to capital goods. 
Policymakers want to engage in more foreign trade and to 
encourage some joint ventures, but apparently the degree of 
opening being considered is quite limited. It does not yet 
appear to reflect any significant change in the basic economic 
development philosophy. In general, the economic policymaking 
situation in North Korea seems to be somewhat fluid domestically; 
my impression is that policymakers are somewhat ill-informed 
about doing business with foreigners and rather nervous about the 
possibilities of foreign exploitation. The environment strikes 
me as roughly comparable to that in China in the early 1970s. 
Relative economic performance 
The respective economic performances of North Korea and 
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South Korea have been very different. The Korean War (1950-1953) 
was very destructive in both North and South. The period since 
the cessation of fighting should be divided into at least two 
phases. In the first phase until the early 1970s, the North 
Korean economy grew very rapidly, substantially more so than the 
South Korean economy. Presumably this was due to the initial 
success in mobilization of resources and increasing saving and 
investment rates in a centrally planned economy, one of the great 
strengths of a command economic system. Moreover, North Korea 
received an estimated $1.4 billion in economic aid between 1954 
and 1960 from the Soviet Union and other communist allies. Much 
of the machinery in North Korean factories is Soviet of 1950s-
1960s vintages. In contrast, the South Korean economy did not do 
very well in its inward-looking, import-substituting development 
policy, based substantially on US economic aid, in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. It was not until the export-oriented development 
strategy and related economic reforms were undertaken from the 
mid-1960s that the South Korean economy began to grow very 
rapidly. South Korea received economic aid from the United 
States, and the normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 and 
the subsequent inflow of Japanese capital, technology, and aid 
were additional contributory factors. 
In the last 10-15 years the growth rates of the two 
economies have reversed. During the decade of the 1980s the 
North Korean economy apparently grew very slowly, perhaps a 3% or 
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so annual average . I have not seen any comprehensive analysis 
and explanation of this slowdown. Presumably it reflected the 
using up of the growth potential of centralized planning and 
allocation of resources, increasing inefficiencies in the use of 
those resources, and an increasingly ageing capital stock. 
Moreover, access to foreign technology was limited, primarily to 
that of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. More recently, 
economic growth has slowed even further and reportedly was 
negative in 1990, due to a combination of two poor harvests and 
traumatic changes in the economic relationship with the Soviet 
Union. North Korea can no longer purchase oil and other 
essentials from the Soviet Union at subsidized prices (oil was 
apparently purchased at 2/3 world prices), and must settle its 
debit balances (and perhaps even individual transactions) in hard 
currency. While North Korean sources, as discussed below, 
implied these new, more severe conditions have already been 
applied, Russian sources indicated they are being put into effect 
I have benefitted in my learning about the North Korean 
economy from: Eui-Gak Hwang, "Economic Comparison of North and 
South Korea", chapter 3 of a book manuscript at the Brookings 
Institution; Teruo Komaki, "Current Status and Prospects of the 
North Korean Economy", in Masao Okonogi, ed., North Korea at the 
Crossroads, (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 
1988) ; Pong S. Lee, "Economic Development Strategy and Prospects 
for Reform in North Korea," in Ilpyong J. Kim, ed., Korean 
Challenges and American Policy (New York: Paragon House, 1991); 
John Merrill, "North Korea's Halting Efforts at Economic Reform", 
in Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, eds., North Korea in 
Transition (forthcoming); Kwan-Chi Ohf—"The Dilemma of the North 
Korean Economy in the Changing World", Korean Journal of 
International Studies XXII, #1 (Spring 1991); Sang-Woo Rhee, 
"North Korea in 1990: Lonesome Struggle to Keep Chuch'e". Asian 
Survey XXXI, #1 (January 1991). 
9 
somewhat more gradually. Regardless, North Korean policy makers 
can no longer rely on the Soviet Union as a significant source of 
economic aid. 
In contrast, the South Korean economy has successfully 
achieved very rapid economic growth for twenty-five years. The 
growth rate has averaged on the order of 7-8% and at times (and 
in recent years) higher. 
These cumulative growth records have resulted in quite 
different levels of economic development and standards of living 
in the two economies. It is estimated that the 1990 GNP (Gross 
National Product) of South Korea is somewhere between four and 
ten times that of North Korea. This wide gap in the estimates 
(discussed below) is disturbing, but the basic fact remains: the 
South Korean economy in total GNP, in per capita output, in 
living standards, in the amount and especially the quality of its 
capital stock, and in level of technology, far surpasses that of 
North Korea. The population of South Korea is about double that 
of North Korea (42.2 million versus 21.4 million). This means 
that the GNP/per capita of South Korea is between 2 and 5 times 
higher than that of North Korea. Given the higher share of GNP 
allocated to defense expenditures in North Korea than in South 
Korea, the gap in living standards is probably wider. That is 
reinforced by increasing South Korean access to foreign consumer 
as well as capital goods, whereas North Korean reliance on 
imported consumer goods is negligible. 
The future prospects of the economies should be viewed in 
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both the short run and the long run. In the short run each 
economy has its own difficulties, but they are opposite: South 
Korea is probably growing too fast, and North Korea had a recent 
absolute decline in GNP and may not have any increase in 1991. 
The South Korean problem is that over the past five years the 
economy has apparently grown faster than its long-run potential 
growth rate, is straining its resources to the limit, and this 
has been reflected in renewed inflationary pressures (inflation 
rates in excess of 10%) and in labor shortages. There also may 
have been some misallocation of investment activities in 1990 to 
urban housing construction, ostensibly for lower-income but in 
reality more for upper-middle-class families, which generated 
excessive increases in construction costs and transferred 
resources away from manufacturing activities. This has shown up 
as a deficit in the current account of the balance of payments in 
1990 and 1991, which has been projected by some to persist, 
though at very modest levels, for another year or two. Some of 
South Korea's economic problems, particularly the dramatic 
increases in wage rates in recent years, are by-products of the 
democratization process since the end of 1987. While some South 
Korean economists pointedly note the economy has not been 
particularly well managed under the Roh government, overall 
macroeconomic performance has been reasonably good. 
It is difficult to ascertain the actual condition of the 
North Korean economy. The impressionistic information one gets 
from visual observation, conversations, and whatever statistical 
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data are available does not provide much direct evidence. 
Apparently there were poor harvests in 1989 and 1990 and this has 
caused problems. Whether they have been due to weather factors, 
or reflect more fundamental problems of land erosion as upland 
has been turned to crop use without adequate erosion protection, 
is not clear. It has been argued that North Korea has severe 
energy shortages of more than a temporary nature. Our evidence 
on this was on the whole supportive of this view. We were told 
by Japanese sources that the energy loss from underground 
transmission of electricity is extraordinarily high. Over time 
the transmission cables, probably placed underground for security 
reasons, have deteriorated and have not been replaced. We were 
told the energy loss was 84% — only 16% of electricity generated 
gets to its final use, an incredible wastage rate. We observed 
only a very small number of vehicles on the city streets and 
highways, and were told that the buses were running less 
frequently than before in explaining why we saw large numbers of 
people walking. On the highway to the east coast port of Wonson, 
three hours from Pyongyang by car, we saw few vehicles, mostly 
trucks and the occasional truck. A substantial proportion — 
perhaps 10% — were broken down and were being repaired — not 
just tires but axles and engines. 
In terms of longer run prospects, it is highly likely the 
South Korean economy will continue to grow rapidly over the 
coming decade and longer. The domestic savings rate is now high, 
entrepreneurship and willingness to invest by businesses large 
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and small are great, the people are ambitious and desirous of 
further improvement in their material standard of living, the 
educational level is rising steadily and there is strong 
recognition of the importance of higher education for economic 
success and social mobility among the populace, and the 
technology level is rising rapidly. At the same time the economy 
will have to work out a new set of management-labor relations and 
this is likely to be a strife-ridden process. Moreover, as 
incomes and wages have risen substantially in Korea, labor-
intensive production is no longer competitive yet medium-high 
technology industries have yet to become competitive. So as 
South Korean continues to climb up the development ladder of 
increasing technology sophistication, greater labor skills, and 
more capital per worker, it finds itself being squeezed from both 
above and below. And the role of the giant family-owned business 
conglomerates (chaebol) will need to be redefined in terms not 
only of economic efficiency but distributional equity and 
economic and political power. Nonetheless, it is likely the 
economy will overcome these problems. It would be dangerous to 
bet against the successful performance of the South Korean 
economy in the foreseeable future. 
The longer-run developmental prospects of North Korea appear 
to be much less good. Presumably the central planners will 
continue to be able to mobilize resources and maintain a high 
saving and investment rate, but like other centrally planned 
economies the utilization of that investment activity is less and 
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less efficient. Part has to do with serious lack of access to 
modern technology from the West (and from South Korea). The 
underlying causes of slow growth are structural in nature. A 
relatively autarkic development strategy has been carried to its 
limits. North Korea needs to increase foreign trade 
considerably, and would benefit from foreign direct investment 
through joint ventures, if the economy is to grow much at all. A 
key question is whether the economy can resume moderate growth — 
say 4-5% — with only modest opening. Or will it require a quite 
substantial, indeed wrenching, opening of foreign trade and 
foreign investment, analogous to the Chinese model, in order to 
bring in sufficient amounts of technology, capital, essential 
imports of machinery and oil and other needed goods, and to 
generate the exports to pay for much of those imports? This is 
probably the most important policy issue facing North Korea 
economic development planners and policy makers. 
The Paucity of Data on the North Korean Economy 
The North Korean government is extremely secretive on all 
matters, including virtually all economic data. Very little data 
are published, and those are of a quite general nature. The 
annual state budget, which usually contains more economic 
information than any other official source in North Korea, is 
typcially announced by the Ministry of Finance at the Supreme 
People's Assembly meeting in early April. Kim II Sung, in his 
annual New Year's speech, sometimes reveals selected information 
on economic performance. Foreign trade data are derived from 
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North Korea's foreign trade partners. Most data published by-
North Korea, including data for most physical output measures, 
are in terms of rates of growth over some base year. With 
neither price nor quantity data available in any detail it is 
very difficult to make even crude estimates of the level of 
economic output and its growth over time. 
Accordingly, the estimates of North Korea GNP vary widely. 
Hwang (op. cit) provides a nice discussion of the various 
estimates and the measurement issues involved. The GNP estimates 
have to be derived from the socialist concepts of output, namely, 
the gross value of social product (GVSP). GVSP involves a 
double-counting of output since it adds up total output at each 
stage of industrial activity rather than incorporating only the 
value added. Moreover, it excludes a range of services which are 
formally identified as unproductive (such as, for instance, 
tourism). Adjustments have to be made to these measures to be 
consistent with the GNP measure standard for international 
comparison with market economics. 
The estimates of GVSP and of GNP derived from them are in 
North Korean currency. A crucial factor is making comparisons is 
to determine what exchange rate to use. There are at least three 
exchange rates: the official rate; the commercial rate; and the 
tourist rate (which has been and still may be linked to the 
commercial rate at slightly less favorable terms). All rates 
have varied somewhat against the dollar; recently the official 
rate was 0.97 won per dollar and the tourist rate 2.2 won per 
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dollar. Since the tourist exchange rate is about 1/2 of that of 
the official exchange rate, the valuation of GNP in dollars is 
cut in half if the tourist rate is used. Presumably the official 
exchange rate has been used for the settlement of trade balances 
with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and other 
official transactions. (If so, there must be major problems in 
negotiating the settlement of North Korean debts to the Soviet 
Union, given Soviet inflation and recent devaluations of the 
ruble against the dollar.) 
While exchange rate-based dollar GNP estimates are useful 
for making comparisons among countries, such measures do not well 
reflect the actual purchasing power, standard of living, or level 
of productivity of economies being compared. A major problem is 
that the prices of services and other non-traded goods typically 
are extremely low in low-income countries and the prices of 
capital goods unusually high even in market economies; this 
results in an underestimate of the income in dollar terms of very 
low-income countries. The Kravis et al rule of thumb is that the 
dollar measure of GNP at exchange rates for very poor countries 
should be multiplied by three and for somewhat less poor 
countries multiplied by two. Thus the per capita income 
estimates of North Korea are somewhat understated in purchasing 
power parity terms; so too are the GNP per capita and standard of 
living estimates of South Korea based on its foreign exchange 
rate, though probably to a lesser degree than for North Korea (if 
the judgement that the lower the income, the greater the 
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understatement of true purchasing power parity, is correct). 
That GVSP and other value measures of North Korean output are in 
prices set by the planning authorities rather than by markets 
adds a further formidable complexity and additional degree of 
uncertainty and inaccuracy to dollar estimates of North Korea 
GNP. 
Economic research on the North Korean economy is done, to 
one degree or another, in the United States, Japan, China, and 
the Soviet Union as well as South Korea. Each country has its 
own advantageous sources of information. For example, Japanese 
research benefits from the occasional visits of North Korean 
residents in Japan back to their home villages; they provide more 
some micro data on actual conditions, particularly in rural 
areas. Similarly, the Soviet Union has had up to 1,000 advisors 
in North Korea, and they have submitted reports on local 
conditions. However, I gather much of these data are collected 
by the intelligence agencies, and relatively little filters 
through for general consumption. Nonetheless, my guess is that 
the academic specialists in each of these countries have a 
reasonably good sense of what the data are. 
The real problem is how to interpret the data in the light 
of its extreme paucity. The estimates of North Korea GNP per 
capita range widely, from as low as $350 per capita (a Soviet 
estimate, evidently derived from comparison with the level of 
development of China, itself subject to serious underestimation) 
to as high as $2400 (based on estimates adjusted at the official 
17 
exchange rate). Most estimates are between $800 and $1500, with 
many centering somewhere around $1100-$12 00. 
Nonetheless, one's estimate in the end is highly 
impressionistic and subjectively judgmental. Much depends on 
whether the viewer sees the North Korean economy as a glass half 
full or half empty. My present view is that in purchasing power 
terms (rather than based on exchange rate conversions) North 
Korean GNP per capita is somewhat greater than $12 00, but that 
its rate of growth (particularly in the earlier years) was less 
rapid than estimates based on exchange rate conversions. 
In contrast, as already noted, there are immense amounts of 
data readily available on the South Korean economy. These 
include detailed estimates not only of GNP and its components, 
but of physical amounts of production for virtually all 
industries and sectors, data on prices, data on foreign trade, 
and the like. South Korean problems of data quality are probably 
no worse than those of other countries at a comparable level of 
development and indeed probably better. While there is some 
distortion of relative prices compared to the international 
relative prices of traded goods, they are readily identified 
(agriculture, some domestic heavy machinery, and the like). It 
is reasonable to take South Korean economic data at face value in 
virtually all dimensions and work from that. Like North Korea 
but to a much lesser extent, purchasing power rather than 
exchange rate comparisons would increase the level of GNP per 
capita, and probably modestly slow its growth rate estimates. 
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WITH WHAT DOES ONE COMPARE THE CURRENT NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY? 
In addition to GNP comparisons based on the available 
statistical evidence, like every visitor I brought to North Korea 
and came away with certain impressions as well. It is important 
to make explicit what are the comparisons that enter one's 
judgments. My comparisons were on a variety of criteria: how 
the North Korean economy compares today with its past, 
particularly after the damage of the Korean War; how it compares 
with South Korea today; how it compares with China in 1974 when I 
first visited it, and with China today; and how it compares with 
what I expected. 
Certainly the most important comparison is of North Korea 
with its own past. By those standards it has obviously done well. 
Pyongyang was in rubble at the end of the Korean War in 1953. By 
contrast, it is now an attractive, well-planned city with wide 
streets, large parks particularly along the river which divides 
the town, many new apartment buildings, and many strikingly 
attractive modern public buildings. And Pyongyang is the 
cleanest city I have ever seen; so too was Wonson and indeed 
everywhere we went. (Even the sides of the highway to Wonson were 
being swept.) There surely has been a great improvement in the 
capacity of the economy to produce all kinds of goods, and to 
raise the standard of living of the people significantly, even 
though consumption may be less than 1/2 of GNP. However, it is 
unclear whether since the early-mid 1980s there has been any 
significant improvement in living standards or indeed of GNP per 
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capita. The quality of goods is not as high as those elsewhere, 
though it seems adequate. We were told by North Korean policy 
makers that although their goods may not be as good as those 
available internationally, they are in sufficient supply and they 
are adequate, and that the people are reasonably content. I saw 
no evidence to dispute that judgement, but evidence of discontent 
is the last thing we could expect to obtain. 
Clearly the material standard of living as well as the 
industrial structure and technological level and industrial 
output capability of South Korea is a quantum leap ahead of that 
of North Korea, as discussed above. Income distribution is 
certainly far from equal in South Korea, but it stands up pretty 
well in international comparison (probably more equal than in the 
United States). It appears that virtually everyone has 
benefitted from South Korea's sustained economic growth. I have 
no evidence on income distribution in North Korea. My guess is 
that, as is common in socialist societies, income is more equally 
distributed in North Korea, despite the perquisites going to the 
ruling elite. 
When I travelled in China in 1974 I saw an economy that was 
in a similar state of policy flux and in a considerably higher 
degree of disorder. Indeed, North Korea is a very orderly 
society without the sorts of disruptions that we saw in China in 
1974, in terms of the closing down of the universities and the 
like. Clothes in China in 1974 were drab, uniform, and 
serviceable, but less good than the clothes that we saw in 
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Pyongyang and elsewhere in North Korea in 1991. My impression is 
that North Korean levels of living today are substantially better 
than China's were in 1974. 
In 1991 Beijing obviously is much more prosperous than 
Pyongyang. It is bustling, and has a wide variety of goods 
available for sale in private as well as state markets; there is 
a tremendous range of qualities and colors of clothing, on 
average much better than North Korea; and the building boom of 
the last decade in Beijing is remarkable. Beijing streets are 
crowded with automobiles and bicycles and pedestrians; there are 
rush hour traffic jams. In Pyongyang the streets have very few 
vehicles, virtually no bicycles, and far fewer people, mostly 
walking; according to our Study Mission distinguished and amiable 
leader Professor Scalapino, bicycles are banned in the city. 
Shopping is done primarily in neighborhood stores where residents 
have to be registered and can buy food, clothing, and other 
household items in rationed amounts at very low prices. Despite 
presumed energy shortages, street and building lights were on in 
Pyongyang, and there were even some neon lights, though nothing 
like the degree to which they have proliferated in Beijing in the 
past decade. 
I asked Bingwei Tao, a Chinese economist who is head of the 
Asia-Pacific Studies Division of the China Institute of 
International Studies, how he compared the average GNP per capita 
or standard of living of China and North Korea. His answer was 
insightful. He pointed out that because there are huge regions 
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of China that are very poor relative to the most productive parts 
of the country, regional income dispersion is high and that 
poverty pulls down the average. In contrast in North Korea, 
since it is a much smaller country geographically and in total 
population, the regional variance in income is less pronounced. 
However, he said that China's capital stock is much better — 
presumably in amount per capita and especially in its embodiment 
of higher levels of technology. 
Frankly, I expected to see in North Korea an economy that 
was in worse shape than what I actually saw. I think I had been 
unduly influenced earlier in conversations with South Korean 
economists who tend, to emphasize the half-empty glass approach, 
stressing North Korea's difficulties and problems. I was 
pleasantly surprised by my visual scenes and experiences, while 
recognizing they probably reflect North Korea at its best. 
Nonetheless, as made clear above, I judge North Korea to be a 
poor economy, no¥ close to economic stagnation, with poor 
economic prospects unless there are substantial changes in 
economic policy. Moreover, I worry that conditions in rural 
North Korea, perhaps particularly in the far north, are not only 
substantially worse than what we observed (to be expected) but 
worse than I have considered. Anecdotal evidence from Koreans 
resident in Japan or Northeast China visiting relatives in North 
Korea suggests village conditions are bad; yet a World Bank study 
indicated that caloric intake was certainly adequate. How bad is 
bad? And are bad conditions temporary (due, say, to poor 
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harvests) or fundamental? 
OTHER OBSERVATIONS 
We do not know much about the industrial structure of the 
North Korean economy. In 1989 the North Korean government 
released extensive demographic data, including labor force by 
occupation and sex, in order to meet requirements for technical 
assistance from the United Nations Population Fund. These data 
have been analyzed in a comprehensive report by Eberstadt and 
Banister . They report 25.3% of the civilian labor force in 
1987 of 12.5 million was agriculture, organized mainly into 
cooperatives and into a smaller number of state farms. Based on 
the demographic data and their reconstructions, Eberstadt and 
Banister also estimate the military forces to comprise at least 
1.2 5 million persons, a substantially higher estimate than that 
of North Korea, and even of other outside estimates of a million 
plus. However, it is estimated some 2 00,000 or so of the 
soldiers are engaged in construction activities for the civilian 
economy; and it may be that some other soldiers engage in part-
time farming activities. As already noted, the industrial 
structure is based on heavy industry. It is asserted that as 
much as 4 0% of industrial production and output is controlled by 
the military to produce goods for the defense apparatus. 
Military expenditures eat up a substantial share of the GNP. 
Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, "North Korea: 
Population Trends and Prospects", Center for International 
Research, U.S. Bureau of the Census (mimeographed, July 11, 
1990). 
23 
As I recall the North Korean estimates are that military 
expenditures comprise about 12% of the state budget. It is 
commonly assumed that the state budget is about 60% of GNP . 
This implies that defense expenditures are about 7% of GNP, 
clearly an unrealistically low estimate. South Korean and United 
States estimates are that military expenditures comprise 20-25% 
of North Korean GNP . It has been estimated that something like 
$375 million of exports in 1990 were of military equipment, 
including SCUDs. This is on the order of 2 0-25% of total 
exports. North Korea has developed a comparative advantage in 
export production of military equipment, a disquieting 
phenomenon. 
We saw some results of investment activities and policies. 
Like other planned economies, North Korea seems to have a strong 
preference for very large-scale investment projects, probably at 
the substantial expense of small, incremental investment 
Application of such ratios are one method of estimating 
GNP. The 60% rate was derived from the experience and GNP 
estimates of other communist planned economies; it has been 
applied by Pong S. Lee, among others. The South Korean 
Unification Board estimates of North Korea GNP assume the state 
budget is 75% of GNP and convert to dollars by using the 
available data on the commercial exchange rate, according to a 
private communication from Pong S. Lee. 
South Korean defense spending has dropped below 4% of GNP 
in 1991 for the first time in 18 years (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, August 1, 1991, p. 12). While this suggests that in 
purely numerical terms absolute amounts of spending may be 
roughly comparable, the technological sophistication of South 
Korean equipment is undoubtedly far higher. Direct military 
forces comparisons are surely far more accurate than attempts to 
estimate spending in comparable units such as dollars. 
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activities in smaller-scale units of production. North Korean 
factories, as elsewhere in socialist economies, probably embody 
the vintage technology of the time they were built, with 
maintenance but without substantial improvements in technology. 
We saw four types of large-scale construction activities, each of 
which was impressive in its own distinctive way. 
One is the "West Sea Barrage", a vast water control project 
at the mouth of the Taedong River below the port of Nampo on the 
west coast. Nampo1s problem is that the tides are on the order 
of 7.5 meters (about 25 feet) daily. This severely affects water 
flows, boat traffic, and control over fresh water for irrigation. 
A 30,000-man unit from the Army was used to construct an eight 
kilometer long dam separating the ocean and the bay, with three 
locks at one end to allow ships of up to 50,000 tons to pass 
through. As a consequence of this successful project the flow of 
water has been stabilized and the fresh water behind the dam is 
at a relatively constant level. This is important for 
aquaculture and particularly for the flow of fresh water to land 
that can be reclaimed for irrigation. The total project includes 
the eventual reclamation of 300,000 hectares of land, of which 
100,000 have already been reclaimed. The dam construction 
methods, according to the film we were shown, were labor-
intensive and relatively simple. A total of 102 people died as a 
result of the construction activities. David Tappan indicated 
that this project was done effectively, using the abundant labor 
available to be mobilized through the military, and using 
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relatively simple equipment and construction techniques. He 
estimated that a major American construction company would have 
carried out the same project with a labor force of about 5,000 
men and much more machinery. Given the abundance of labor in 
North Korea and the ability to mobilize it from military uses, 
this was an efficient mix of labor and capital. The project cost 
about the equivalent of $4 billion. Whether this was an 
efficient use of capital is a matter to be analyzed, but it 
certainly was an effective use in the sense that this is a major 
project that has been completed. We were told that the project 
paid for itself through the control of a major flood that 
occurred several years after the project was completed. 
Certainly flood control as well as other benefits need to be 
estimated in doing a cost/benefit evaluation of the efficiency of 
the project. 
Apparently the 300,000 hectares of reclaimed land constitute 
an important potential source of grain output as envisaged under 
the third Seven Year Plan. Assuming that 5 tons of rice per 
hectare are produced, this would result in an additional 1.5 
million tons of grain. However, that falls substantially short 
of the targeted increase in total grain output from a reported 10 
million tons (which may be high) to 15 million tons, and of rice 
to 7 million tons. I share Komaki's pessimism that the grain 
output target will not be achieved. 
A second impressive form of investment activity is urban 
apartment construction. In driving into and within Pyongyang, one 
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is struck by the large number of apartment houses, eight stories 
or so high, that are pervasive throughout the city. William 
Maynes, an expert on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, noted 
that the architecture is on the Soviet model but more attractive 
in North Korea and the buildings appear far cleaner and better-
maintained. At the same time we saw an extraordinary number of 
uncompleted apartment buildings, which were "under construction", 
and indeed work was being done on some of them. However, the 
number of uncompleted buildings was excessive. It involves a 
wasteful tying up of steel and raw materials, even if the 
opportunity cost of the military construction workers is zero; 
the cement and steel otherwise could have been exported and 
earned vitally needed foreign exchange. Moreover, the North 
Korean complaint of labor shortages clearly reflects such 
misallocation of workers as well as labor-intensive methods of 
production and the very large army. It is not clear why there 
has been such a long gestation period on the completion of these 
buildings. I offer two hypotheses: the supply of skilled 
craftsmen to finish off the interiors of the buildings is 
limited; and the availability of building supplies to complete 
the buildings is limited. Perhaps the exteriors of the buildings 
were put up because their construction is relatively easy by 
military construction units. 
One of the striking visual scenes of Pyongyang is the 105-
story hotel under construction in the center of the city, a third 
type of major investment project. It is shaped rather like a 
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sharply vertical pyramid. Clearly this is a showcase project. It 
is designed to have 3,000 rooms, some 6,000 beds, especially for 
tourists as a foreign exchange earner. Many of the lower windows 
have been blocked in with what appear to be cement blocks. The 
explanation is that in the winter the wind blows through and it 
is excessively cold for interior construction work. 
The project has two problems. First, can such a hotel be 
filled to capacity on an ordinary operating basis once completed? 
At present there is not adequate infrastructure — airplanes, 
local transport, and other tourist facilities — to handle enough 
people to fill 3,000 hotel rooms nightly. This would place a 
tremendous strain on existing infrastructure, even though it 
would be a very beneficial foreign exchange earner. Moreover, I 
do not see where sufficient demand would come from on a sustained 
basis, unless North Korea made it easy and attractive for South 
Korean visitors (an unlikely prospect in the near term). 
Interestingly, in our meeting with Vice Minister of External 
Economic Relations Kim, he stressed this as one of two projects 
for which they would like to have foreign involvement, notably in 
the management of the hotel's operations. He indicated the 
government was prepared to provide special concessions, such as 
not binding it by existing laws and allowing a casino in the 
hotel. He said that a Hong Kong entrepreneur had invested in the 
project, and that some Chinese Americans visiting Pyongyang on a 
tour has expressed interest. However, unless far greater tourist 
demand is generated than seems likely, this project is likely to 
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be an expensive white elephant. 
Apparently, a second and far more serious problem with this 
105-story hotel project has to do with the technical aspects of 
its construction. All we have are rumors, no hard facts. We 
heard that an East German engineering company had investigated 
the project and found the building to be structurally unsound. 
We heard the building had tilted somewhat, perhaps because its 
foundation had settled unevenly. We heard that, consequently, no 
elevators can be installed. We heard that the windows pop out, 
one reason why there are no windows installed. We saw no 
evidence of construction activity, but were told it is proceeding 
inside the building. Scalapino said the building appeared no 
different from his visit to Pyongyang two years ago. If indeed 
this building cannot be completed it will be far more than a 
white elephant; it will be a national embarrassment. 
The fourth type of major investment activity was in sports 
stadia and monuments. A certain amount is undoubtedly necessary, 
to provide public amenities. An additional amount may be 
justified for nation-building in a young state — to install a 
sense of national pride, a la Sukarno in Indonesia's early 
independence period. However, Pyongyang has an edifice complex. 
In addition to the 105-story hotel, it has an Arch of Triumph 
larger than the one in Paris and the obelisk monument to the 
chuch'e concept, in honor of President Kim II Sung's seventieth 
birthday, taller than the Washington Monument. North Korea is 
estimated to have spent some $5 billion (equivalent to perhaps 
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one-fifth of one year's GNP) building some 280 new facilities 
including an attractive 150,000 seat stadium, by far the largest 
in Asia, in connection with its sponsorship of the 13th World 
Youth Festival in 1989 (North Korea News, January 15, 1990, cited 
in Rhee, op. cit.) The obelisks and billboards with exhortatory 
slogans from the sayings of Kim II Sung or his son and heir 
apparent Kim Jong II scattered throughout the cities, and giant 
slogans cut into the mountainsides, and even the huge statue of 
Kim II Sung in Pyongyang were somewhat less ubiquitous and 
oppressive than I had anticipated (once again the problem of 
preconceptions). Such sloganeering and creation of a cult of 
leadership may contribute to nation-building; I leave that to 
political scientists and others to judge. Even so, for a poor 
country to devote so many resources to political purposes has to 
be very costly in straight economic development terms. 
Foreign Economic Policy 
Several members of our Study Mission had a good, useful, 
informative meeting with the Vice Minister of External Economic 
Affairs Kim Jon U and several members of his staff. He first 
described the administrative arrangements for foreign trade and 
external economic relations. There are two ministries. The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade handles the export and import of 
specific goods and trade policy. The Ministry of External 
Economic Affairs engages in broadly defined economic cooperation, 
including the export and import of complete plants, the handling 
of foreign construction projects, broad technical assistance 
30 
cooperation with nonaligned and Third World countries, and the 
financing of plant imports through foreign loans, as well as 
joint ventures with participants from foreign countries. His 
ministry has four vice ministers, one each in charge of 
capitalist countries and socialist countries (Mr. Kim); African 
and other Third World countries; foreign construction activities; 
and the internal administrative affairs of the ministry. The 
External Economic Promotion Committee handles relationships with 
countries with which North Korea does not have formal political 
relationships; Vice Minister Kim is its Chairman. 
The Soviet Union has been by far North Korea's most 
important foreign economic partner for some forty years. While 
trade has decreased somewhat in recent years and even more since 
late 1990, it still comprised about 40-50 percent of imports and 
exports for 1989 and 1990. The main imports from the Soviet 
Union have been coke, aluminum, machine tools, trucks, and autos; 
and exports of magnesia clinker, cement, zinc, lead, steel plate, 
and machine tools. We were told that virtually all trucks and 
buses were produced in North Korea, the only exception being the 
engines for some very large trucks. The cars we saw on the road 
were predominantly Mercedes Benz (to our surprise) though there 
was a sprinkling of Toyotas and Nissans. They are almost all 
assigned to various government ministry and agency car pools. We 
were told the only private cars are owned by rich North Koreans 
from Japan. 
However, the economic relationship with the Soviet Union 
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changed dramatically when the new agreement was signed November 
1, 1990, going into effect on January 1, 1991. The agreement 
ended the previous clearing arrangement for the handling of 
bilateral trade balances under which, I understand from other 
sources, North Korea was able to cumulate debit balances (de 
facto loans) from the Soviet Union on the order of 2-3 billion 
rubles (though, as already noted, the exchange rate used for 
conversion and ultimate settlement is bound to be controversial). 
Moreover, under the new agreement all balances have to be settled 
in convertible currencies — the US dollar, though the Swiss 
franc may be used when both sides agree — and all transactions 
booked in convertible currencies. Of at least equal 
significance, all imports and exports are at world prices. In 
the past the Soviet Union sold its oil to North Korea at a 
subsidized price below world prices; I learn from other sources 
it was about 2/3 of the world price. We did not obtain 
information on the prices at which North Korean goods were sold 
to the Soviet Union; it is not clear the terms of trade 
benefitted North Korea as much as the oil price would suggest. 
As a result of the agreement, trade with the Soviet Union 
had declined substantially in recent months. We subsequently 
were told that imports had stopped altogether from November 1990 
until a new one-year trade agreement, rather than the previously 
standard five-year agreement, was signed between North Korea and 
the USSR in April 1991. According to the subsequent study 
mission discussions in Moscow, those negotiations were 
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complicated by the Soviet insistance that North Korea pay off 
some of its accumulated debt; they reportedly did agree to repay 
several hundred million dollars. The November 1990 agreement 
made no new Soviet loans and contined no other special 
provisions, Mr. Kim stated. 
In the short run trade with the Soviet Union will be 
difficult because of the economic decline in the Soviet Union and 
its problems of political instability. In the longer run, 
however, Mr. Kim anticipates that the USSR as well as China will 
continue to be good trading partners with whom trade will expand. 
This is natural, given geography, the respective economic 
structures of the economies, and particularly (to my mind) the 
historic set of specific trading relationships between specific 
enterprises, as well as North Korea's continuing need to obtain 
replacement parts for repairs of machinery and equipment earlier 
imported from the Soviet Union. 
Vice Minister Kim stressed that the international dimension 
of the North Korean economy is completely market based (though by 
state trading agencies, of course); transactions are done 
essentially at international prices relying on international 
markets. The previous priority given to the USSR and socialist 
and nonaligned economies will weaken, and trade patterns are 
likely to diversify under this new regime of international prices 
and hard currency settlement. 
Trade with China is expected to expand over time. North 
Korea now exports concentrated iron ore, cement, and machine 
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tools; and imports oil, coke, industrial textile goods, raw 
rubber, and machine tools. However, the earlier principle of 
trading raw materials for raw materials and machine tools for 
machine tools will not prevail in the future. Japanese and South 
Korean experts agree that China sells its oil to North Korea at 
one-half the world market price. While trade with China will 
increase, Chinese sources indicated that they did not expect to 
be able to provide substantial foreign economic aid to North 
Korea, certainly not sufficient to replace the aid provided by 
the Soviet Union. China is not a source of loans and does not 
appear to be a source of trade or technology to solve North 
Korea's current economic problems. 
Exports to Japan doubled between 1984 and 1990, from $145 
million to $300 million, according to standard Japanese sources 
(JETRO), but the total trade is partial and small. North Korea 
imports have been small ($255 million in 1984) and declining 
($176 million in 1990). From a Japanese perspective, it is trade 
between Koreans in North Korea and Koreans in Japan. Since 1987 
North Korea has actually had an export surplus with Japan. The 
main reason is that all exports from Japan must be on a cash 
basis since North Korea defaulted in the early 1980s, even after 
a renegotiation of the debt, on a large loan from Mitsui Trading 
Company ($500 million or so) for a cement plant. However, 
apparently North Korea obtains trade credit from at least one 
Austrian bank, though probably in limited amounts. The prospects 
for trade and general economic relations with Japan depend 
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fundamentally upon the normalization of relations and the terms 
of any related financial settlement. 
North Korea has no trade with the United States. Perhaps it 
is better put the other way: because of its trade and investment 
embargo against North Korea, the United States has no trade or 
commercial relations with North Korea. North Korea would like to 
see the embargo ended and to develop trade and joint venture 
investment relationships, particularly (or at first) with Korean 
Americans. North Korea wants to import heavy machinery, 
electronics, and other relatively technologically sophisticated 
goods from the United States. It realizes that it could not 
export machinery to the United States, but it certainly could 
export processed minerals for which, after all, there are 
international markets. 
The North Korean government is also interested in 
establishing joint ventures with foreign firms. The main 
purposes are to bring in foreign technology and to produce 
exports. Vice Minister Kim said there are some thirty joint 
ventures in operation, mainly with Koreans in Japan; since they 
are recently established they have not yet begun to generate 
substantial amounts of exports. He hopes for another 200 or so 
joint ventures in the next year or two. 
Vice Minister Kim specifically suggested two large projects 
as worthy of American investment attention. One is the 105-story 
hotel which needs foreign management and operations, since it 
will be aimed at the foreign tourist market, as has been 
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discussed above. The other is a proposed special economic zone 
in the far northeastern corner of North Korea, in the Tumangang 
triangle, which borders on China and the USSR, as well as the 
East Sea (or, as the Japanese term it, the Japan Sea). This area 
has a locational advantage whereby it could reduce transport 
costs to the Soviet Union and northern China from Japan or the 
United States. For northeast China in particular, it would 
provide a closer deepwater access than Dalien, far to the south 
by rail. Kim pointed out that from San Francisco to Dalien it 
takes 2 6 days by boat, but would only take 2 0 days to this 
special economic zone. He estimated this project would result in 
a saving of freight costs of 10%. Moreover, it would provide the 
basis for development of a more widespread special economic zone, 
including manufacturing and other activities. The United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) is presently making a preliminary 
study of this project. Some interest in Japan apparently has 
been expressed in this project and a preliminary investigation is 
underway. Tony Namkung suggests there are substantial economic 
problems. Apparently the river has to be dredged for some 18 
miles in order to have oceangoing vessels of any size reach the 
designated port. There apparently is a spur rail line of sorts, 
but substantial further rail and other infrastructure adjustments 
will surely be required. 
North Korea has an overseas construction company which has 
been operating abroad on projects for some ten years in Libya, 
the Arab Emirates, Yemen, and to a small extent, in the USSR. 
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Presumably these are selling relatively unskilled construction 
labor services and do not embody high engineering technologies. 
North Korea Hard Currency Foreign Debt Problems 
North Korea has an estimated foreign debt of about $6.8 
billion, I gather, though estimation of the dollar value of 
Soviet, East European and Chinese credits is difficult. Much is 
with Japan. All debt from market economy sources has been 
defaulted on. This means that virtually all North Korean imports 
must be purchased in cash. Trade credit must be modest. Vice 
Minister Kim stated that it is presently not possible to service 
the debt because domestic production is needed for domestic uses. 
Only as trade is expanded will it be possible to service the 
debt. More importantly, North Korea intends to use the expected 
reparations or other payments generated from normalization with 
Japan to service its debt, at least sufficiently to reestablish 
creditworthiness, according to Japanese sources. Certainly Vice 
Minister Kim's expectation is that once relations are normalized 
with Japan, and with the United States, considerable foreign 
capital will flow into North Korea in various forms. This 
includes trade credit, World Bank and other international agency 
loans, and private foreign direct investment. There seems to be 
some expectation that once normalizations have taken place, 
embargoes ended, and the doors opened on both sides, then foreign 
funds and investors will fairly readily flow into North Korea. 
This certainly is an optimistic assessment, and unrealistic in 
the short run. However, it may well be indicative of the long-
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run changes in external economic policy the North Korean 
government is forced to consider seriously. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
I derive two general policy conclusions, which I believe are 
shared by other members of our Study Mission. 
First, the North Korean economy is unlikely to collapse 
within the foreseeable future, despite long-run and structural as 
well as short-run problems. The levels of production and income 
are sufficiently high and the society so extraordinarily well 
mobilized (organized and indoctrinated), that it is unlikely 
there will be loss of control over the economy or any sort of 
economic chaos. This is reinforced by the seeming reality (and 
standard view) that ordinary persons apparently know virtually 
nothing about conditions in South Korea or abroad, economic or 
political, other than what they are told by the government. Yet 
some information must filter in. Koreans resident in Japan, 
China, or elsewhere on occasion visit relatives and ancestral 
villages in North Korea. Small but regular tourist groups visit 
(we met one from Taiwan), though on a carefully selected route of 
resort hotels. Thousands of young North Koreans have studied in 
the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China. Rumor undoubtedly 
substitutes for hard fact. We simply do not know how much North 
Koreans know, much less what they really think. Nonetheless, it 
is a highly controlled, seemingly placid society. I certainly 
was impressed by the absence of armed soldiers or police in the 
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places we visited. 
Thus, I do not visualize collapse of the North Korean 
economy as likely to become a major cause of instability on the 
Korean peninsula in the foreseeable future. However, if there 
were other sources of internal tension — such as conflict 
emerging in a generational transition period — then economic 
difficulties might be used by one group or another as 
justification for political as well as economic change. In sum, 
current or future economic difficulties could feed into a 
political process so as to exacerbate tensions, but are not 
likely to be a basic cause of such tensions. 
Second, North Korea is eager to expand its trade, joint 
venture and other economic relations with the United States as 
well as Japan and indeed with all countries other than South 
Korea. Policy makers are eager to see the US trade and direct 
investment embargoes removed or at least substantially reduced. 
They recognize North Korea will have to sell and buy at world 
prices. North Korea can export a variety of processed minerals 
to the world, since they are standard homogeneous goods, and 
probably simple, inexpensive machine tools to low income 
countries. North Korea's fundamental problem, as in any planned 
economy, is how to reallocate output from domestic uses to 
exports. This is a bureaucratic central planning issue even more 
than an economic issue, I suspect. 
In the longer run, North Korea will have to go beyond the 
export of minerals and whatever manufactured goods it can now 
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produce relatively competitively. It is difficult to know 
product by product where North Korean comparative advantage lies. 
Presumably it is in labor-intensive production of textiles and 
other light industrial goods. Such a pattern of development 
probably will have to be accomplished in a manner similar to 
South China, whereby marketing, technology, and other managerial 
skills are somehow imported. North Korea's other area of 
comparative advantage is in military hardware, as already noted. 
This poses difficult political problems for the United States and 
all nations concerned with conventional weapons proliferation. 
North Korean policy makers seem to expect to obtain 
considerable foreign resources — goods, technology, management, 
market know-how — through foreign aid, loans, and direct 
investment. Where will this come from? The historic source, the 
Soviet Union, is no longer willing or capable. China, with its 
own developmental needs and problems, will not make substantial 
additional resources available. Nor will the United States. 
South Korea is a real possibility in theory, but in practice is 
rejected by North Korea as the paramount source of subversion. 
Access by North Korea to the international lenders — the World 
Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank — will require 
wrenching changes in North Korean economic policy, much less the 
ending of economic secrecy and sharing of hard quantitative data 
with them; even so, access would take time. 
Japan remains the major viable candidate as a source of 
resources for North Korea. The dramatic about-face in North 
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Korean diplomacy — to seek to normalize relations with its 
former colonizer which it has long vilified and still deeply 
mistrusts — has to be in large part because of the North Korean 
perception that it has a rightful claim of reparations in payment 
for Japan's damages as a colonizer. My guess is that 
normalization will take place but it will take considerable time 
and will result in substantially smaller Japanese payments than 
North Korea expects. It appears that trade rather more than aid 
or investment must be the route to a successful North Korean 
economic opening strategy. 
North Korea faces a deep economic policy dilemma, initially 
of degree but probably ultimately of kind. That is: how far and 
in what ways should the economy open itself up to international 
economic transactions? It is clear that the historical autarkic 
strategy can not persist in its current form. Will only modest 
opening, combined with Japanese foreign economic assistance and 
perhaps some international institution loans, be sufficient to 
maintain an economy that in most respects continues to remain 
closed? Or will it require a far greater opening to sustain 
future economic development and growth? A modest opening of 
economic relations can be consistent with a philosophy of 
economic self-reliance 8. After all, self-reliance does not 
o 
This and other points are nicely made in the paper by Kim 
Su Yong, Chair of the Economics Faculty at Kim II Sung 
University, in his paper "Expanding and Developing the Regional 
Economic Cooperation is the Common Task of the East Asian 
Countries" presented to the May 1991 symposium "Northeast Asia's 
Emerging Order in a Changing World" sponsored in Tokyo by the 
Yomiuri Shimbun and the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George 
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necessarily mean autarky; it means independence from foreign 
exploitation. 
The great danger of enhanced opening for the government is 
essentially political. While the elite are well informed, 
ordinary North Koreans know very little about foreign economic 
opportunities, social conditions, and the like. The process of 
economic interactions with foreigners can only increase their 
information about the rest of the world. How will this new 
information be received and absorbed, and filtered and 
counterbalanced through the government? Will opening to the 
world result over the long run in the subversion of the domestic 
political and economic system? That must be of deep concern to 
the North Korean leadership. The political danger is heightened 
by the fact that the counter-model to the North Korean "socialist 
paradise on earth" is on its southern border and consists of 
fellow Koreans: South Korea. No doubt a great fear in both 
Koreas — North and South — is that as a consequence of some 
internal shock somehow the DMZ border will be breached by a huge 
flow of North Korean civilians to South Korea in search of food, 
higher incomes, and greater personal and political freedoms. For 
North Korea that would spell the end of the regime. For South 
Korea that would impose an intolerably heavy economic burden. 
South Korea and the United States also face policy choices: 
to attempt to force the collapse of the Korean economy by 
Washington University. 
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continued embargoes and other measures; or to try to "educate" 
the North Korean economy to the ways of the world through 
economic, cultural, and other forms of exchange. To date, the 
United States and South Korea have pursued the former policy. In 
my judgement, it is not a policy that is likely to bring about 
North Korean collapse even over the longer run. Moreover, if it 
were pursued vigorously — say, by encouraging an arms and 
military expenditures race (such as South Korea Team Spirit 
exercises and North Korean reactive mobilization) between South 
Korea and North Korea in order to drain further the resources of 
North Korea — it could well lead to military adventurism or at 
least a heightening of the already paranoid sense of military 
threat on both sides of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). 
The better option is to remove existing barriers to economic 
relations with North Korea, and to expand those relations on a 
step-by-step basis. The long-run objective would be to broaden 
the knowledge, horizons, and perceptions of North Koreans, the 
policy making elite and the common people alike. In a sense this 
implies subversion of the Communist state through peaceful means. 
The model of course is East Germany, and its absorption by West 
Germany. That model surely must provide tremendous concern for 
the North Korean government; it accentuates the dilemma they 
face. 
I found it interesting that everyone I spoke to in Japan and 
in South Korea believes that in the long run South Korea will 
indeed absorb North Korea economically and politically. The one 
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state-one economic system format will be based on the South 
Korean model, not the North Korean model; and it is difficult to 
conceive of an intermediate, compromise model given the inherent 
contradictions between the two systems. This position has 
considerable economic logic, given the much larger size and 
prospects for continuing substantially better economic growth in 
South Korea. 
I found it also interesting that most South Korean policy 
makers do not express an eagerness to achieve complete 
reunification and full economic integration quickly. They regard 
the costs as simply too staggering, especially as they evaluate 
the German experience. Certainly a major consideration is that 
full reunification will presumably allow full mobility of South 
Koreans to North Korea and North Koreans to South Korea. Given 
the tremendous wage and income disparities between North and 
South, the expectation is that South Korea would be overwhelmed 
by the influx of potential North Korean workers — far beyond the 
current capacity of the South Korean economy to absorb despite 
the emerging labor shortages in South Korea. Encouraging the 
opening of North Korea is a better and certainly a safer policy 
in the shorter run, and probably better in the longer run. I 
have no clear sense of the process by which full reunification 
will eventually occur. The German model may turn out to be less 
relevant than many think. The Chinese experience of gradually 
opening its economy to international transactions and gradual and 
piecemeal movement toward market forces may be a more appropriate 
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model, at least for predictive purposes, for North Korea in the 
foreseeable future. 
If South Korea believes that eventually it will absorb North 
Korea economically, then it has a vested interest in trying to 
reduce those future costs. One way is to narrow the economical 
differentials between North and South, namely by encouraging very 
rapid economic growth in North Korea. However, that would have 
to be done under condition of reductions in military expenditures 
by both North and South and in reduced military tensions, so that 
there would be real assurance that the increased economic 
resources being generated through economic growth were going to 
the civilian sectors rather than the military. If South Korea 
really believes its absorption model, then it should be pleased 
to see North Korea growing even more rapidly than South Korea in 
order that the differential narrows. However, to take that 
position — and perhaps the commitment of South Korean resources 
to North Korean development — requires high levels of mutual 
trust and confidence, in sharp contrast to current high levels of 
mistrust and fear in both South and North. 
United States policy toward North Korea has not changed 
substantially for some forty years. Yet the new conditions on 
the Korean peninsula and in the regional environment much less 
the global environment, as well as the situations in the four 
major powers in the region, now make the United States policy 
outmoded, static, and sterile. The time has come to engage in a 
step-by-step process of removing barriers to economic 
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transactions between the United States and North Korea, and of 
opening up economic relations based on normal market forces. 
Similarly, the United States should encourage trade and other 
economic relations between South Korea and North Korea, for all 
the same reasons. 
August 16, 1991 draft 
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